We develop an analytical framework to investigate the impact of differences in privatisation method on economic growth in transition economies. Using dynamic panel data methods, a growth equation is estimated over 23 countries for the period 1990-2001. Mass privatisation is found to have a significant positive effect on growth, but full privatisation is not found to have a significant effect. The explanations we suggest relate to the underdeveloped capital market in transition economies. If the wealth distribution inherited from communism is 'wrong,' the matching of owners to firms under full privatisation will be inefficient. Mass privatisation has the advantage of leaving more spending power in the private sector, so real consumption and investment demand is greater.
Introduction
Although the impact of privatisation on the performance of firms has been studied extensively (see the survey by Megginson and Netter, 2001) , literature addressing the macroeconomic aspects of privatisation is sparse.
1 Nonetheless, privatisation can affect economic growth through a variety of channels and these effects may differ across alternative methods of privatisation. Here we consider these factors empirically, estimating an aggregate growth model for 23 economies in transition from 1990 to 2001.
2
Our analysis provides a test, at least indirectly, of several competing and complementary hypotheses. The first is that, if the positive effects of privatisation per se on the financial performance and productivity of firms predicted by microeconomic theory obtain, these effects will have a macroeconomic analog, raising economic growth. Second, the type of ownership may matter (Djankov and Murrell, 2002) .
Some types may lead to more efficient matching of buyers with firms and to better corporate governance, while others may be associated with managerial and worker entrenchment. Given that capital markets are relatively underdeveloped in transition economies, the identity of those to whom firms are privatised may be significant.
Third, the greater is the expenditure of private agents on the purchase of shares from the government, the more tightly will the spending ability of the private sector be constrained. Thus, different methods of privatisation may have different effects on 1 Hansen (1997) analyses technology choices under different privatisation schemes, and Schipke (2001) sketches general macroeconomic themes related to privatisation.
2 Our data set covers all the transition countries listed by EBRD (2002) , except for Bosnia and Herzogovina, FRYugoslavia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, for which relevant data are not available. We cover Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.
investment spending in the privatised sector and on consumption spending by households. Fourth, some methods of privatisation may generate more government revenue than others. Greater revenue will tend to raise a government's ability to spend on infrastructure, with a potential positive feedback on aggregate productivity (Aghion and Schankerman, 1999) . Fifth, if economic growth is positively associated with capital market development, and so if different privatisation methods have different effects on capital market development, another channel is provided through which privatisation method may affect growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998 ).
In Section 2 we outline our theoretical framework, and in Section 3 we discuss the specification of the estimating equations and the data used. The results are reported in Section 4, while in Section 5, which concludes, we interpret our findings.
The data sources are reported in the Appendix.
Theoretical Framework
In this section we present the simple theoretical framework for our empirical contribution. We first classify privatisation methods and then specify equations for real aggregate demand and supply, in each of which the method of privatisation is an argument. Combining these equations, we obtain an expression in which real GDP depends on the method of privatisation and a variety of other factors. 3 This expression is the basis of our empirical work. 3 The empirical literature on growth commonly adopts a Cobb-Douglas production function and is based on the assumption that each economy is close to its steady-state growth path (e.g., Barro, 1991 Djankov and Murrell, 2002 There is also a potential interaction between privatisation method and capital market development. For example, implementation of mass privatisation policies in Poland was explicitly associated with plans for capital market development (Balcerovic, 1995) , and, more generally, we may expect mass privatisation to be associated with the spontaneous development of capital markets.
Of the three methods, full privatisation would be expected to yield the most revenue, at least in the short term, and mass privatisation the least. Mixed privatisation would be expected to yield an intermediate amount of revenue because the firm is usually sold at a positive, but preferential, price. Since different privatisation methods generate different amounts of revenue for the government, they may impact differently on public capital expenditure , G and so, potentially, on economic growth. If productive government expenditure is financed by distortionary taxation, more such expenditure has an effect on economic growth that may be of either sign (Barro, 1991) . Insofar as privatisation programs in transition economies are a non-distortionary source of revenue, productive investment financed by this revenue will have a positive impact on growth. However, a large proportion of public investment is financed in other ways, particularly by highly distortionary taxation.
Also, the transition economies' investment performance during the communist era exhibited extreme inefficiency. Hence, we expect at best a weak positive relationship between public sector investment and real aggregate supply.
Let y denote real GDP. Setting ds yy = , we can solve (1) and (2) for p :
constructed to ensure primarily outsider ownership.
Substituting (4) into (2) of mixed privatisation will be a relatively low level of y , but the ranking of the other two methods in this respect is unclear. However, given that with mass privatisation the positive effect on demand may be relatively small, we expect that full privatisation, because of its efficient matching, will have the greatest effect on real GDP, at least in economies with more developed capital markets.
Specification and Data
We estimate a cross-country growth model along the lines of, e.g., Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) . However, using equation (5), we supplement the model with indicators of private sector development, privatisation method, capital market development and government capital expenditure. We also interact privatisation method, private sector and capital market development in some of the empirical analysis. For emerging markets, similar methodology has been applied to capital market development by, e.g., Bekaert and Harvey (2000) and Henry (2000) .
The basic model is therefore We use panel data analysis (within-groups estimators) to exploit both timeseries and cross-section variation in data, in particular in the relationship between growth and privatisation method. Equation (6) is estimated in first-difference form, to take out country-specific fixed effects. We test for time-specific as well as countryspecific fixed effects in each regression, and compare the performance of model (6) with its dynamic counterpart. For the dynamic version of the model, with lagged dependent variables, we use generalised-method-of-moments (GMM) estimation, dealing with potential problems of endogeneity of the explanatory variables by instrumenting on lagged values. GMM estimation also allows us to address the correlation between the error term and lagged endogenous variables.
The three privatisation dummies have both a cross-section and a time-series dimension. We specify the chosen method of privatisation in each country and then identify the date at which this privatisation method was introduced. 
Results
We first estimate versions of equation (6), before addressing issues of dynamics using GMM methods and undertaking sensitivity tests. In all equations we use White's correction for robust standard errors. In Table 2 , we report four versions of equation (6), taking into account potential interactions between capital market development, private sector development and method of privatisation. Column (1) represents the simplest formulation, with no interactions. In column (2) we include a term for the interaction between capital market development and private sector development, and in column (3) we include an interaction term between stock market development and mass privatisation. Column (4) includes both interaction terms. (4)).
The coefficients on factor inputs are stable and significant across the three formulations. The findings are consistent with the type of growth process identified by Barro (1991) and many others, with the coefficient on capital estimated to be around .08. The coefficient on employment is also highly significant, but lower than typically obtains in the West, perhaps because of labor hoarding. Additionally, there is a relatively small but significant impact of labour quality change on GDP growth.
Private sector and stock market development are not found to be independently significant in column (1). However, once their interaction term is included (column (2)), we identify a significant positive impact of stock market development on GDP growth, together with a small negative interaction effect. This suggests that the independent growth-enhancing effects of capital sector development relied on private sector development, but tailed off as an economy approached a Western ownership and capital market structure. The interaction of stock market development with mass privatisation (column (3)) is not significant. 8 Thus we
conclude that the impact of stock market development on growth is associated with the expansion of the private sector as a whole but we cannot isolate a relationship with the particular privatisation methods.
Turning to the direct impact of privatisation methods on growth, the findings are consistent across the three specifications. Neither full nor mixed privatisation exerts a significant independent influence on GDP growth, but the coefficient on mass privatisation is always positive and at least weakly significant. However, the coefficient on government capital expenditure is insignificant in each specification.
9
Thus, full privatisation both fails to influence growth directly, and fails to do so indirectly through the potential macro-economic externality that could derive from spending the increased government revenues on infrastructure.
10
To test the robustness of our results we rework the same three specifications of OLS regressions with a simple formulation of dynamics (inclusion of a lagged endogenous variable). The results, which are reported in Table 3 , suggest that a dynamic specification is appropriate: the lagged endogenous variable is significant in all three columns, and its inclusion eradicates the significance of the contemporaneous employment variable. However, our conclusions about the impact of capital market development and privatisation methods on growth are not affected by the dynamic specification. The coefficients on stock market development and its interaction term with private sector development are significant in columns (2) and (4), and the coefficient on mass privatisation is positive and significant in the three specifications.
The coefficients on mixed privatisation, full privatisation and government capital expenditure are not significant in any of the four columns. 9 To check the robustness of the finding with respect to government capital expenditure we reestimated columns (1)-(3) of Table 2 replacing GIS by the EBRD (1996 EBRD ( , 2003 index of infrastructure reform. The coefficients and standard errors on the factor inputs and privatisation methods are hardly affected and the index is not significant in any regression (see Bennett, et al., 2003) .
Since dynamic effects are significant in all the specifications, we also undertake GMM estimation. The GMM estimates for the three specifications with factor inputs (investment, employment and labour quality) and government expenditure instrumented, are reported in Table 4 . This largely confirms the results of the previous tables. The lagged endogenous variable is only significant in column (3) and the impact of each of the three factor inputs are found to be positive and significant, while government capital expenditure is persistently insignificant in the three specifications. The conclusions from Table 2 concerning private sector and capital market development are confirmed by Table 4 , as are the findings concerning mass and full privatisation. 
Concluding Comments
Although our empirical analysis does not corroborate the hypothesis that private sector development has a significant independent positive effect on growth, it does
show that the method of privatisation plays an important role. If we had found that full privatisation has had a significant growth effect, this would have verified the hypothesis that efficient corporate governance and the matching of buyers with firms are critical. An advantage of full privatisation is that it leads to concentrated ownership, whereas mass privatisation has the converse effects. Since, however, we find that it is mass privatisation that has the positive effect, the matching argument seems to be relatively weak. This may because in any economy the ability to purchase 11 Additional experiments were undertaken to test the stability of the parameters and the robustness of the results. For example, the sample was split between the sub-periods 1990-1995 and 1996-2001 , and between CIS and non-CIS countries. In each case, the pattern of estimated parameters was similar, though because of the decline in degrees of freedom, standard errors increased and we decided not to report the findings. The main results concerning stock market and private sector development, government capital expenditure and method or privatisation were found to hold post-1995, and for CIS countries. The equations were also re-estimated excluding data for Belarus, because its state as a transition country might be questioned (e.g., its low level of privatisation). The parameter estimates and standard errors were virtually unchanged. a firm, or at least a substantial ownership share, is imperfectly correlated with the skills required to run the firm efficiently. In an economy with an extremely underdeveloped capital market, 'wrong' owners will tend to persist for longer. 12 The positive effect of mass privatisation has been justified on political economy grounds (Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny, 1995) , but it is also consistent with the hypothesis that the method of privatisation may foster growth through the effects on the demand for consumption or investment goods.
We find that capital market development has a significant positive impact on growth when the interaction of capital market and private sector development is allowed for. This capital market effect also depends on what privatisation method is used. It is weakest with mixed privatisation, possibly because MEBOs are associated owner-managerial entrenchment, i.e., with a lack of share trading.
We hypothesise that government capital investment might have played a significant role in generating growth, through the provision of public goods. In this case, the benefits of full privatisation could have obtained through the greater revenue it has generated for the government. Our analysis indicates that the argument with respect to public goods is a weak one, suggesting that transition governments in this period did not use revenue effectively. Support for privatisation programmes is linked to the need to remove political interference and bureaucratic inefficiency from firms' operations. But it should also be taken into account that similar political and bureaucratic considerations play a role in the allocation of government expenditure.
12 This argument is strengthened if the income distribution inherited from the communist era was especially misaligned with the ability to run firms. In the Czech Republic, for example, the distribution of shares at nominal cost to the general public led to shares being placed in the hands of privatisation funds, which exerted pressure on managers to be relatively efficient. The argument does not apply to full privatisation to foreign investors, but, as we have already noted, the amount of such privatisation has been relatively small.
Thus, although full privatisation raises more (immediate) government revenue than mass privatisation does, the extent to which this is translated into faster economic growth may be disappointing. Note: Year of privatisation was established using EBRD information on primary method of privatisation and its privatisation chronicle. 
DATA APPENDIX
The data used in this paper describe 23 of the 27 transition economies covered in the EBRD Transition Reports (various years), which provide complete information for 1990-2001 on macroeconomic variables including GDP, employment and gross fixed capital formation, and the indicators of institutional investment used in the paper. Bosnia and Herzegovina, FRYugoslavia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan were excluded from the analysis because complete data on these countries were unavailable.
Gross Domestic Product
The base year for the GDP series was sourced from the World Bank's Historically Planned Economies: A Guide to the Data, taking the 1988 figure, measured in constant 1987 market prices. 13 Figures were converted into US dollars using the 1987 exchange rate. For the countries that later disintegrated (Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and USSR), we broke the GDP total into constituent parts using information on the constituent countries' proportion in total GDP provided by UN, World Bank and national sources. The total USSR figure was divided into Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The total figure for Yugoslavia was divided to obtain separate country data for Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia. The total figure for Czechoslovakia was divided to obtain separate data on Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Data for 1989-2001 were obtained by extending the series from 1988 using EBRD real GDP growth rates covering 1989-2001.
Fixed Capital Investment
Fixed capital investment () FCI figures were obtained from the EBRD (1999 EBRD ( , 2000 EBRD ( , 2001 EBRD ( , 2002 by taking the real gross fixed investment rate, measured in annual percentage change. For the few cases in which such information was unavailable, alternative measures were used. The main alternative source was data on investment share in GDP provided by IMF and EBRD. This ratio was applied to our GDP levels figures to obtain fixed capital investment levels data. An annual percentage change in fixed capital investment was calculated from the levels figures. We also used GDP level figures in order to calculate fixed capital investment growth in the early years of the 1990s in the few cases when information on annual percentage change in investment was not available. We calculated fixed capital investment figures by applying fixed capital investment to GDP ratios, provided by IMF and National Statistics sources, to our GDP levels figures.
Employment Information on employment growth was obtained from EBRD employment time series, measured in annual percentage change, for 1989-2001.
Investment In Human Capital
The measure chosen for investment in human capital was gross enrolment in tertiary education, defined as the total number of students who had attained a certain level of education as a percentage of the total population in the age group. The data were obtained using TransMonee Database, produced by UNICEF, by taking 5-year period averages. These series were preferred to UNESCO data, which are inconsistent with the World Bank source and show some unconvincingly high growth of enrolment rates for several countries.
